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The modernisation of EU state aid law and taxation
Some international tax lawyers may, occasionally, be made uneasy by the realisation that their
subject is now much affected by, and indeed considered by some to be a branch of, international
trade law. The question of how trade law should deal with direct tax issues has had some attention
in the academic literature.1 It deserves, perhaps, much more attention than it receives. Views
will, inevitably, vary on the precise nature of the relationship between tax law and trade law. In
states where trade law is part of the law of regional integration, to which national law must be
1 J. Slemrod and R.S. Avi-Yonah, “(How) Should Trade Agreements deal with Income Tax Issues” (2001–2002) 55
Tax Law Review 533. See also: P.R. McDaniel, “Panel IV: The Pursuit of National Tax Policies in a Globalized
Environment: Principal Paper: Trade and Taxation” (2000–2001) 26 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1621;
R.S. Avi-Yonah, “Treating Tax Issues through Trade Regimes” (2000–2001) 26 Brooklyn Journal of International
Law 1683; P.R. McDaniel, “Impact of Trade Agreements on Tax Systems” (2002) 30 Intertax 166; P.R. McDaniel,
“The David R. Tillinghast Lecture, Trade Agreements and Income Taxation, Interactions Conflicts and Resolutions”
(2003–2004) 57 Tax Law Review 275.
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subservient (as is the case in the EU), the prospect of tax law being subject to trade law, in the
form of state aid rules for example, is likely to cause little surprise. In states which have to
consider, primarily, the relationship between their tax law andWorld Trade Organisation (WTO)
rules, the reaction may be somewhat different. On one matter, however, there is likely to be
substantial agreement, namely that, if one has state aid rules, they have to address the role of
taxation if they are to be effective. As Professor McDaniel has said: “…failure to place special
tax provisions under the state aid structure would create an enormous loophole in the state aid
regime.”2
Trade and tax law
The growth of bilateral trade agreements is greatly increasing the scope for tax law to be governed
by concepts from outside its discipline. So far as multilateral agreements are concerned, there
has for a long time been the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and GATT 94 to
keep in mind. As is well known, the prohibition on export subsidies led to a series of important
cases in the early 1980s affecting certain European states and the US.3 Subsequently, the treatment
of the foreign sales corporation in the US resulted in considerable litigation.4 The agreements
established at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round have, of course, significant implications for
tax systems.5 The current dispute over some provisions of Argentina’s profit tax before theWTO
confirms that.6 The fact that a number of states wish to intervene in the dispute suggests that the
implications of the case are unlikely to be confined to the parties.
So far as EU law is concerned, it has for very many years been clear that tax falls within the
ambit of state-aid law.7 It is not only Member States which must have regard to the concept of
state aid. The trading partners of Member States must also pay attention to it.8 The importance
2McDaniel (2002), above fn.1, 170.
3Panel Report, Tax Legislation—United States Tax Legislation (DISC), L/4422, adopted December 7–8, 1981, BISD
23S/98; Panel Report, Tax Legislation—Income Tax Practices Maintained By France, L/4423, adopted December
7–8, 1981, BISD 23S/114; Panel Report, Tax Legislation—Income Tax Practices Maintained By Belgium, L/4424,
adopted December 7–8, 1981, BISD 23S/127; Panel Report, Tax Legislation—Income Tax Practices Maintained By
The Netherlands, L/4425, adopted December 7–8, 1981, BISD 23S/137.
4United States—Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations.” WTO Doc. WT/DS108/AB/R, February 24, 2000;
Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS108/AB/RW, “United States—Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’”
January 14, 2002—Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities; Dispute Settlement: Dispute
DS108/AB/RW “Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’”— Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU
by the European Communities, February 13, 2006.
5See, e.g. the General Agreement on Trade in Services which under General Exceptions in Art.XIV permits exceptions
to the national treatment rule provided that the differential treatment in question is aimed at ensuring “the equitable
or effective imposition or collection of direct taxes” and as a result brings tax law firmly within the ambit of the
agreement. See alsoWTO Report, IFA Cahiers de droit fiscal international, 2008, Vol.93a, 73, Daly. For an example
of a comparable provision in an EU agreement see the EU/South Korea FTA at arts 7.50 and 15.7, OJ L127/6, 14.5.11,
but note also arts 2.9–2.11, 7.8, 7.24.
6See DS 453 in which complaint is made by Paraguay about the Argentine Decree 1344/987 as amended by Decree
1037/00.
7Commission v Italy (C-173/73) [1974] ECR 709 at [13], where the Court noted that EEC law distinguished between
State measures by reference to their effects not their causes or aims. “Consequently, the alleged fiscal nature or social
aim of the measure in issue cannot suffice to shield it …”
8See Commission Decision of February 13, 2007 on the incompatibility of certain Swiss company tax regimes with
the Agreement between the EEC and the Swiss Confederation of July 22, 1972, C(2007) 411 final. Art.23(1)(ii) of
the EEC/Switzerland Agreement of 1972 contains a provision very similar to the prohibition of state aid in the EEC
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of state-aid law in the context of taxation has become particularly important in recent times. In
his speech at the Competition Forum in February 2014, Commissioner Algirdas Šemeta,
responsible for taxation and customs union, statistics, audit and anti-fraud, specifically noted
that competition policy in general and state-aid law in particular could “greatly reinforce our tax
policy work.” He went on to say:
“Recently, as mentioned by Vice-President Almunia…,9 the Commission is gathering again
information on tax planning strategies under state aid rules.
We are looking at various instruments that play a role in tax planning, such as tax rulings.
…
[P]ursuing cases under competition rules can make a real difference as they can be
enforced directly on the basis of the EU Treaty and should provide results in a precise
timeframe.”10
The statements of the Commission are confirmed by its actions. Shortly after that speech in
February, on March 24, 2014, the Commission announced that it had adopted two information
injunctions against Luxembourg seeking information about its tax ruling system and intellectual
property tax regime. A few days later, onMarch 27, 2014, the Commission announced an enquiry
into French reductions in the “contribution au service public de l’électricité” for “large energy
consumers.”11 The same day it announced that it had changed its views on the UK’s rules on tax
relief in respect of video games, noting the removal of the territorial spending obligations.12 The
latter part of 2013 had also seen activity in relation to state aid and taxation. In December 2013,
an in-depth enquiry was announced into the exemption for “young innovative companies” from
Belgian payroll tax on part of the remuneration paid to scientific personnel.13 That had been
preceded, in November 2013, by the announcement of an in-depth state-aid investigation into
French tax exemptions for certain maritime chartering services in France.14 Back in October 2013
the Commission had, as is well known, published its preliminary view that the tax system of
Treaty. It prohibits “any public aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings
or the production of certain goods”. Contrast the approach of the EU/Korea Free Trade Agreement OJ L127/6, 14.5.11
at Art.11.11.
9Commissioner Joaquin Almunia is the European Commissioner for Competition and one of the Vice-Presidents of
the Commission.
10“EU Tax Policy and Competition Policy—A Complementary Approach to Fair Taxation”, speech of Commissioner
Šemeta at the Competition Forum, 11.2.2014, European Commission—SPEECH/14/117 available at: http://europa
.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-117_en.htm?locale=en [Accessed March 31, 2014].
11“State aid: Commission approves aid for on-shore wind power in France; opens in-depth inquiry into tax reductions
for large energy consumers” European Commission Press release IP/14/327, 27.3.2014, available at: http://europa.eu
/rapid/press-release_IP-14-327_en.htm?locale=en [Accessed March 31, 2014].
12“State aid: Commission approves UK video games tax relief plan” European Commission Press release IP/14/331,
27.3.2014, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-331_en.htm?locale=en [Accessed March 31,
2014].
13 “State aid: Commission opens in-depth investigation into tax exemptions given to certain Belgian companies”
European Commission Press release IP/13/1203, 4.12.2013, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13
-1203_en.htm [Accessed March 31, 2014].
14“State aid: Commission opens in-depth investigation into fiscal exemptions for certain maritime chartering services
in France” European Commission Press release IP/13/1043, 6.11.13, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release
_IP-13-1043_en.htm [Accessed March 31, 2014].
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Gibraltar contravened state aid rules in relation to passive, inter-company, loan interest and
royalty income.15
Against the background of all this activity involving the application of state aid law, it has to
be borne in mind that state aid law itself is subject to development. Its ability to encompass tax
law at all shows that, as the Swiss would no doubt testify. The whole project of EU state aid law
modernisation is, therefore, of great potential significance to tax practitioners. The project was
announced on May 8, 2012.16 It was intended that modernisation should foster growth in a more
dynamic internal market, focus enforcement on cases with the biggest impact and create
streamlined rules facilitating faster decisions. So far there have been guidelines issued in a
number of areas including risk finance and aviation and new regional state aid guidelines.17
Consultation is continuing in many other areas. One particular aim of the Commission is to
clarify and better explain the notion of state aid. This was the subject of consultation between
January 17, 2014 andMarch 14, 2014. The consultation document took the form of draft guidance
contained in a Draft Commission Notice on the notion of State aid pursuant to Article 107(1)
TFEU.18
The Draft Notice
As the aim of the Draft Notice is to clarify and better explain, it does not reduce the value of the
existing Commission Notice on the application of state-aid rules to business tax19 and the
subsequent Report.20 It does contain, however, a useful statement of the scope of the state-aid
rules so far as tax is concerned. At paragraph 53 it states:
“A positive transfer of funds is not necessary, as a foregoing State revenues is sufficient.
Waiving revenue which would otherwise have been paid to the State constitutes a transfer
of State resources. For example, a “shortfall” in tax and social security revenue due to
exemptions or reductions in taxes or social security contributions granted by the Member
State, or exemptions from the obligation to pay fines or other pecuniary penalties, fulfils
the State resources requirement of Article 107(1) TFEU.”21 (footnotes omitted).
15State aid SA.34914 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN)—Gibraltar Corporate Income Tax Regime OJ C348/184 (28.11.2013).
16Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EU State Aid Modernisation (SAM) COM/2012/ 0209/ final.
17For details of those areas where work has been concluded or is continuing see the Commission’s web-page on State
Aid Modernisation (SAM) available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/modernisation/index_en.html
[Accessed March 31, 2014].
18 European Commission, Consultation on the Notice on the notion of State aid and Communication from the
Commission—Draft Commission Notice on the notion of State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU (the
Communication), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2014_state_aid_notion/index_en.html
[Accessed March 31, 2014].
19Notice on the application of the state aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation OJ C384/3 (10.12.98)
20 The report on the implementation of the Commission notice on the application of the state aid rules to measures
relating to direct business taxation C(2004) 434, 9.2.2004, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid
/studies_reports/rapportaidesfiscales_en.pdf [Accessed March 31, 2014].
21The Communication, above fn.18.
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There is nothing here to cause any surprise. The broad scope of state-aid rules is now well
understood.22 Even the statutory instruments dealing with very narrow areas of taxation recognise
that. For example, the provisions governing the community infrastructure levy recognise that
the provision of state aid has to be avoided by local authorities applying the rules governing
discretionary relief for exceptional circumstances.23
Although the entirety of the Communication is worthy of study, it is its specific statements
in relation to fiscal state aid which are of particular interest for present purposes. These are
preceded by considerable discussion of material selectivity and regional selectivity24 and it is no
surprise to see references to the recent litigation affecting Gibraltar.25 Matters concerning
selectivity are of particular significance in relation to taxation as the document acknowledges.
Nevertheless, more than a further six pages of the 50 page document are devoted specifically to
fiscal state aid. That is an eloquent demonstration of just how important DG Competition regards
this whole area.26 There are specific sections dealing with co-operative societies, undertakings
for collective investment, tax amnesties, tax settlements and rulings, depreciation and amortisation
rules, flat tax regimes for specific activities, anti-abuse rules and excise duties. It is these specific
sections rather than the general discussion to which attention is paid below.
So far as co-operative companies are concerned, it is acknowledged that they are not in a
comparable legal or factual position to commercial companies. Preferential tax treatment for
them may, therefore, be permitted subject to certain conditions.27 In relation to undertakings for
collective investment, it is made clear that provisions designed to achieve tax neutrality, preventing
double economic taxation, will not be regarded as selective. Tax neutrality in this context is the
establishment of equivalence between direct investment and indirect investment in, for example,
government securities or shares.28 What is said about tax amnesties, that is, immunity from
criminal prosecution, fines and interest, will be of significance to many Member States. They
are considered a “general measure” if certain conditions are met. The first of these is that
“the measure should be of an exceptional nature, provide a strong incentive for undertakings
to voluntarily comply with the tax obligations, and enhance tax debt collection.”29
Reference is made amongst other things to their limited temporal application while being open
long enough to permit all those who benefit from it to apply.
Of more general interest is the comment on tax rulings:
“If in daily practice tax rules need to be interpreted, they should not leave room for the
discretionary treatment of undertakings. Every decision by the administration that departs
22As the Commission makes clear it is the effect of the rule in question that is material not its formulation: see, e.g.
the Communication, above fn.18, para.122.
23See the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010 (SI 2010/948) reg.55(3)(c)(ii).
24See the Communication, above fn.18, paras 121–156.
25Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom (Joined Cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09
P) discussed in this Review at T. Lyons, “Commission and Spain v Gibraltar and the United Kingdom: a landmark
case on engineered tax regimes” [2012] BTR 55.
26 The heading “Specific Fiscal Aid Issues” appears in the Communication, above fn.18, 40 at s.5.4, para.157. The
section concludes at 47, para.185.
27See the Communication, above fn.18, paras 158–161.
28See the Communication, above fn.18, para.163.
29See the Communication, above fn.18, para.167.
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from the general tax rules and benefits individual undertakings leads in principle to a
presumption of State aid and must be analysed in detail.”30
That comment demonstrates just how far reaching the state-aid rules are. Their influence,
however, in this context is very welcome. Walton J’s aphorism that “One should be taxed by
law, and not be untaxed by concession”31 is well-known in the UK. He would, perhaps, have
been pleasantly surprised to see it reinforced by EU state-aid law. The Communication also
makes clear that administrative rulings may give rise to state aid, particularly where they result
in reductions in liability “in contradiction” to the tax law.32
The comments on tax settlements are also likely to be worth careful review. There will be
somemembers of the UK Parliament whomay find the following comment of particular interest:
“While the competence of Member States in this field is not disputable, State aid may be
involved, in particular, where it appears that the amount of taxes due has been significantly
reduced without clear justification (such as optimising the recovery of debt) or in a
disproportionate manner to the benefit of the taxpayer.”33
The negotiation of settlements can be a particularly sensitive activity if entirely domestic
considerations are to be borne in mind. The presence of EU state aid law, quite properly, as a
material consideration will do nothing to make it simpler.
General depreciation and amortization rules are said not to amount to state aid, as one would
expect, though there are specific circumstances in which they may constitute aid.34 Similarly,
flat tax regimes for specific activities do not infringe state aid law if they are justified by the
need to avoid disproportionate tax burdens and do not entail tax advantages for specific categories
of taxpayer.35 So far as anti-abuse rules are concerned, they may be justified by the logic of
preventing tax avoidance. Nevertheless, if they are not applied to certain transactions or
undertakings, in a way which is inconsistent with their underlying logic, then they too can infringe
state aid law.36
The approach in all of these areas tends to exclude discretion from tax regimes and makes
their application as broad as possible. It will probably, therefore, be widely supported. It is to
be hoped, however, that it will not lead to any rise in attempts to justify treating taxpayers
differently by reference to the general nature of the tax system. That justification is not always
easy to apply in practice and has been questioned in some quarters.37
30See the Communication, above fn.18, para.171.
31Vestey v Inland Revenue Comrs (No.1) [1977] STC 414; [1979] Ch 177 (Ch. Div) at 197.
32See the Communication, above fn.18, para.177.
33See the Communication, above fn.18, para.172.
34See the Communication, above fn.18, paras 178–181.
35See the Communication, above fn.18, para.183.
36See the Communication, above fn.18, para.184.
37See e.g. B. Kurcz and D.Vallindas, “Can general measures be … selective? Some thoughts on the interpretation of
a state aid definition” [2008] CMLR 159.
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Conclusion
The Communication makes clear that the application of state aid law to tax will continue to be
a matter of great importance for the Commission. It can be expected to act accordingly. As we
noted, only a short time after publication of the Communication, Luxembourg was being pressed
to account for its regime of tax rulings having regard to state aid law. That state of affairs makes
clear another significant truth, namely that state aid law is not concerned just with substantive
tax law. The administration of a tax system is also within its purview. SometimesMember States’
tax authorities may regard that as something of a mixed blessing. More generally, though, this
broad application of state aid law, or trade law as it appears some would see it, is surely likely
to meet with general approval from all those who support the creation of an undistorted internal
market.
Timothy Lyons QC
Amortisation; Anti-avoidance; Collective investment schemes; Co-operative societies; Depreciation; EU law;
Excise duty; State aid; Tax administration
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